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Universal Basic Income—Introduction
A
lmost daily, we confront media coverage regarding
universal basic income (UBI). Stories abound in every
major media outlet from CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News to
the New York Times, Boston Globe, Washington Post, and
the Wall Street Journal. On the presidential debate stage,
American entrepreneur and Democratic presidential candidate Andrew Yang has made UBI a primary platform of his
campaign, proposing “The Freedom Dividend,” a $1,000
per month stipend for every American adult. In the state
of Maine, on June 19, 2019, Governor Janet Mills signed
LD 1324 into law. This bill created a committee to study
the benefits and feasibility for starting a universal basic
income program for the state of Maine. After their research
is complete, this 13-member committee will present their
findings and draft bills for the Maine Legislature to consider
in 2020. Though it may seem like a left-leaning policy at
first blush, the concept has gained bipartisan popularity
with support from the Adam Smith Institute and the Cato
Institute, two major right-leaning think tanks, which are
both exploring policy options and publishing papers that
argue about UBI’s ability to fix the broken welfare state.
The nonpartisan publication at the Margaret Chase
Smith Policy Center, Maine Policy Review, featured a
commentary by philosopher Michael Howard titled,
“Universal Basic Income: Policy Options at National, State,
and Local Levels.” This article created quite a stir in policy
circles throughout the state, polarizing opinions and
provoking intense debate. Attorney and adjunct faculty
member at the University of Southern Maine Dave Canarie
wrote a counter to Howard’s piece entitled “Not Ready for
Prime Time: A Response to ‘Universal Basic Income: Policy
Options at National, State, and Local Levels,’” where he
highlighted the social and economic costs of a guaranteed
income policy for all Americans. Howard wanted his
chance to respond. It became clear that this was an
important conversation for the state of Maine worthy of
debate in a public forum. We invited local, regional, and
international experts on UBI to participate in a new feature
for the Margaret Chase Smith Policy Center: Maine Policy
Perspectives. In total, the perspectives of seven individuals
are included in this roundtable regarding UBI.
So what is UBI? Oftentimes, media reports regarding
UBI are rather vague. Academic and policy researchers,
however, typically use the term universal basic income or
simply basic income in reference to a program that provides
payments to everyone in a given community—whether
local, state, or national. This stipend would have no strings
attached and individuals would receive a UBI regardless of
their personal economic condition or employment status.
In theory, UBI should be able to provide an amount suffi-
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cient to pay for an individual’s basic necessities, a figure that
is nearly as debated as the idea itself.
Howard’s commentary in MPR highlighted the worldwide interest in UBI policies from the municipal level in
the United States to European-wide initiatives debated in
the European Union. He listed four main reasons in
support of UBI:
•
•
•
•

Fear that automation and artificial intelligence
will displace workers
Realization that current social safety-net
programs neither provide jobs nor eliminate
poverty
Desire to address rising inequalities
Aspiration to remunerate individuals for care
work, volunteering, and environmentally sustainable lifestyles

Howard also notes two major categories of objections
against UBI, which he generally describes as economic and
moral. On a economic level, opponents argue that it is
impossibly expensive. He contends that through the simplification of the welfare system and increased income taxes, a
federal value-added tax, or the taxation of resources held in
common UBI is expensive, but feasible. On moral grounds,
opponents fear that giving individuals a stipend with no
needed behavioral modifications or preliminary means
testing would subsidize able-bodied individuals who simply
chose not to work. Howard admits that some people would
take advantage of the system; however, he argues that most
people, if given the chance, would use their UBI to fund
personal growth through education, artistic creation, or
entrepreneurship; care for their children or aging family
members; volunteer their time to provide community
services; or seize the ability to live simply in an environmentally sustainable lifestyle. Howard also contends that
the idea of decoupling income from work should not be
seen as radical in the current capitalist society of the United
States. In fact, he points out that through inherited wealth,
interest, and dividends, many people already have unconditional income, and society does not view these types of
income as promoting laziness.
Howard then explores policy options at the federal,
state, and local levels. He highlights that UBI was actually
quite popular in the 1960s and 1970s and was supported
by both of the major political parties. Martin Luther King
and Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern
favored minimum guaranteed income while right-wing
economist Milton Friedman supported a means-tested
unconditional minimum income. In fact, President Richard
Nixon was in favor of a modified version of Friedman’s
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model, the Family Assistance Plan, which passed the
House of Representatives, but was defeated in the Senate.
Howard points to the Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend
as a successful policy for states to redistribute monies
gained through access to common resources, which has
been in effect since 1976. In resource-poor states such as
Maine, Howard argues, taxes on carbon, earned income
tax credits, and universal child allowances are experiments
with UBI-type programs that can stimulate public
discourse, provide empirical evidence, and suggest examples for more nuanced welfare reform programs in the
national sphere based on UBI.
The individuals participating in this Maine Policy
Perspectives roundtable were asked to read “Universal
Basic Income: Policy Options at National, State, and Local
Levels” as well as Dave Canarie’s rebuttal. They then were
asked to briefly draw upon their expertise and experiences
to argue for or against UBI. Though it is not necessary, we
invite readers of this roundtable to first peruse Michael
Howard’s original commentary in MPR that sparked this
lively debate. The structure of this Maine Policy Perspectives
forum is that three arguments against UBI will be
presented first followed by three arguments in support of
UBI. Finally, having read all of the pieces by our panel,
Michael Howard receives the last word of the forum by
responding to the discourse created by his initial commentary in MPR.
The first piece in this forum is a republishing of “Not
Ready for Prime Time: A Response to ‘Universal Basic
Income: Policy Options at National, State, and Local
Levels’” by Dave Canarie. Canarie argues that UBI is staggeringly expensive, that inherited wealth, interest, and
dividend payments are not decoupled from labor but
directly tied to labor, that wealth and success is not always
linked to luck and privilege, and that abandoning our
current social safety net for the experiment of UBI is too
great a risk when the consequences of failure are a burden
of the nation’s most vulnerable citizens. Canarie’s piece is
followed by historian Daniel S. Soucier who argues that
the technological changes wrought by automation and
artificial intelligence may be no more disruptive than technological changes that have occurred in the past. Instead
technological change often leads to unforeseen economic
opportunities and eventual economic growth. He also
argues that abandoning our current social safety net, which
has been built on decades of worker displacement due to
disruptive technologies, is misguided policy. Finally,
human rights economist Philip Harvey argues that UBI
fails to secure both the right to work and the right to
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income security as highlighted by the United Nations. In
fact, by providing everyone with the same income stipend,
UBI, because of its universality, provides no additional
compensation to displaced workers, nor does it provide
low-wage earners with additional real income. Harvey
notes that despite even though UBI is currently fiscally
unattainable, the opportunity costs are also prohibitively
high. Instead, monies should be focused on job programs
that get able-bodied individuals into the workforce and on
providing truly unstigmatized livable income to those in
society unable to be self-supporting.
Project Manager at the Future of Humanity Institute
Georg Arndt and economist Karl Wiederquist argue that
the actual cost of UBI policy options are far less than the
gross cost, but far more difficult to calculate. They contend
that the gross cost of UBI is misleading because a substantial amount of UBI is paid for by individuals based on the
income they already earn. For example, if the government
taxes an individual $5,000 and then pays that person a
dividend of $5,000, the net cost of UBI for that individual
is zero dollars. Thus, Arndt and Widerquist argue that any
argument against UBI based on gross costs without
discussing exact tax burden and marginal tax rates are
misleading and not very useful in the overall debate of the
topic. Sociologist Luisa Deprez notes that income is not
keeping pace with the cost of basic needs, especially in the
state of Maine. Further exacerbating matters is the precariousness of social safety-net programs at the federal level.
With income inequality on the rise and current programs
proving ineffective at solving the issue of poverty, Deprez
calls for careful review of the literature regarding UBI and
for a serious debate of its feasibility as a policy option at the
state level instead of merely dismissing it as “not ready for
prime time.” Finally, political scientist Almaz Zelleke
argues that UBI is far superior to our current social safety-net programs. Its universality ensures no one falls
through the cracks. Its unconditionality provides income
for those who contribute to society outside of the traditional workforce. Its flat benefit does not penalize individuals who improve their status through the combining of
households or through part-time, seasonal, and temporary
employment. Further, UBI is an ethical statement by
society that everyone deserves access to the means necessary to a healthy and productive life. Zelleke closes by
contending that the best way to get UBI into the national
agenda—as with many initially controversial policy
measures—is to implement it in a few forward-thinking
states such as Maine.
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Universal Basic Income:
Policy Options at National, State, and Local Levels
by Michael W. Howard

O

n September 11, 2018, Chicago
Mayor Rahm Emanuel announced
the formation of a task force “to pursue
the exploration of Universal Basic
Income in the city.” Emanuel was
responding to a resolution proposed by
Alderman Ameya Pawar and supported
by others on the city council (Byrne
2018; Coelho 2018; McFarland 2018).
Pawar was inspired by the pilot project
being launched in Stockton, California,
which will give 100 people $500 per
month for 18 months. This project was
motivated by worries about automation
and the desire to provide more opportunity for people in poor communities
(Crane 2018). Pilot projects with various
kinds of minimum-income schemes
have been completed, announced,
or begun in Oakland, California;
Barcelona, Spain; Ontario, Canada;
Finland; Scotland; India; Kenya;
Uganda; Namibia; and the Netherlands
(https://basicincome.org/topic/pilot
-experiments/; Haarmann and Haarmann
2014; Kotecki 2018; McFarland 2017a,
2017c; Standing et al. 2015). In 2016,
Swiss citizens initiated and voted on a
referendum to give every Swiss citizen
an unconditional basic income adequate
for basic needs and a life of dignity
(Martin 2016), and a European-wide
initiative for basic income, with the
support of 300,000 EU citizens, was
presented to the European Parliament
in 2013–2014 , but was voted down
in 2017 (McFarland 2017b). There is
worldwide interest in basic income, and
the concept has been considered favorably, if not yet embraced, by some
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American politicians at the national level
(Clinton 2017; Obama 2018).
Supporters of basic income include
Silicon Valley tycoons and others who
worry that artificial intelligence and
automation will displace more jobs than
they will create, necessitating new forms
of income security for those who are
displaced. The concept is also supported
by many people who recognize that
current welfare policies are not effective
at eliminating poverty or moving people
into work. Other supporters see basic
income as a way to address rising
inequality, while some supporters see it
as a way to partially decouple income
from paid employment, as a way to
recognize and encourage care work,
volunteering, or more sustainable living
(Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017).
DEFINITION OF A BASIC INCOME

W

hat is a basic income? Is it a
desirable and feasible policy? And
could such a policy be implemented on
a state or local level?
Although press coverage is rather
vague, most researchers use the term
basic income to refer to an income that
is given to all, periodically rather than in
a lump sum, individually rather than to
households, and not conditional on
need, willingness to work, or other
behavioral requirements. Some add that
a basic income is sufficient for basic
needs, but exactly what this level is, is
subject to much debate. We can distinguish roughly between a full basic
income that would satisfy some such

•
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requirement, and a partial basic income
that would fall short of that level. A
basic income is distinct from other
forms of guaranteed minimum income
including a negative income tax (unconditional, but means tested), a participation income (conditional on making
some form of meaningful contribution
to society, but not necessarily paid
employment), universal child allowances
(going unconditionally to all children,
regardless of means), and capital grants
(universal, but given in a lump sum, for
example, at age 18).
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR

I

have already hinted at the arguments
for basic income. If automation
displaces more jobs than it creates—a
proposition that is debated even among
supporters of basic income—then
decoupling income from labor may be
necessary to avoid growing poverty. An
Oxford University study predicted that
nearly half of all jobs in America will
likely be eliminated by automation in
the next few decades (Frey and Osborne
2013). Think of drivers displaced by selfdriving vehicles, food-service workers
displaced by robot waiters, and retail
sales clerks displaced by automatic
checkout machines. This conclusion
has been challenged by critics noting
that, although tasks within jobs may be
eliminated, the jobs may remain and be
redefined (Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn
2016; Chui, Manyika, and Miremadi
2016;). Still, if 60 percent of a job can
be taken over by a computer, then there

38
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may be a need for only 40 percent of
the workers in that occupation. Actual
job loss might be closer to 9 percent,
according to Arntz, Gregory, and
Zierahn (2016).
Related to, but distinct from, the
automation argument is the argument
from precarity—an insecure or unpredictable existence, which may affect a
person’s psychological well-being—
(Standing 2014). Although the American
economy has been creating jobs steadily,
many of these jobs are part-time, temporary, and poorly paid. Thus a second
argument for basic income is that it is
needed to ensure that workers have
adequate income and do not need to
work two full-time jobs, or several parttime jobs, to make ends meet. A basic
income, which at first glance appears to
be anti-work by giving people income
not conditional on willingness to work,
is in fact more work friendly than the
current system, which creates a poverty
trap: people do not seek employment for
fear of losing their means-tested and
conditional benefits. Because people
keep their basic income when they find
employment, this disincentive to a job is
completely eliminated.
A third argument for basic income
challenges what we mean by work. Much
of the necessary work in our society is
not counted as part of GDP (gross
domestic product), and is done without
remuneration, and often in conditions of
economic dependency. This fact is especially true for household care of children
and the elderly, which is done disproportionately by women. A basic income
would give recognition to this work,
afford women some measure of economic
independence, and at an adequate level,
lift them and their children out of
poverty. Moreover, it would do so
without the bureaucratic difficulties that
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would arise from trying to administer
wages for housework. In addition, a
basic income would facilitate other kinds
of meaningful, but unremunerated,
contributions to society, such as volunteering for nonprofit organizations.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST

A

mong objections to basic income,
the two most prominent are financial and moral. The gross cost of a basic
income appears quite large. If every legal
US resident were given an annual basic
income of, say, $12,000 per adult, and
$6,000 per child, the gross cost would
be $3.415 trillion (Widerquist 2017).
But the gross cost is not very meaningful. Everyone would receive a basic
income, but the more affluent would
be net contributors: they would pay
more in taxes than they would receive
in basic income. The poor would be net
beneficiaries. And some people would
break even.
The more interesting question is the
net cost for the net contributors. The
answer varies depending on how a basic
income is integrated with the tax system.
But with a 50 percent tax surcharge on
earned income, the net cost would be
less than one-sixth of the gross cost,
$539 billion. And that is without considering the potential elimination of other
programs, such as food stamps or
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) benefits, which might be redundant with a basic income. Furthermore,
this net cost also does not take into
account the savings that would likely
result from improved health and lower
crime rates. Although $539 billion is
still expensive, it is feasible. Especially if
we consider that it would completely
eliminate poverty for 43 million people,
including 14.5 million children. More

•
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modest proposals of about half this level,
such as that of Facebook cofounder
Chris Hughes (2018), who favors a
means-tested negative income tax with a
work requirement—but broadening the
definition of work to include care work
and other socially useful activities—
could be funded with moderate tax
increases on those making more than
$250,000 per year.
There are other ways of funding a
basic income besides income tax. Andrew
Yang (2018), who is running for the
Democratic presidential nomination in
2020, favors a basic income of $1,000
per month, funded by a value-added tax
(cf. Walker 2016). Peter Barnes (2014)
favors taxing common resources, such as
natural resources, electromagnetic spectrum, the use of the atmosphere as a
carbon sink, and the right to create
money, which could support a basic
income of around $5,000 per year, rather
than being given away to private companies. Barnes’s model is Alaska’s Permanent
Fund Dividend, around $1,400 per year
paid to every Alaskan, including children, from the annual interest earned by
Alaska’s sovereign wealth fund, which
has been capitalized with royalties paid
by oil companies drilling on the North
Slope since the 1970s. The dividend has
contributed to Alaska’s relatively low
rates of poverty and inequality
(Widerquist and Howard 2012a, 2012b).
Hillary Clinton (2017) considered
proposing something similar, “Alaska for
America,” during her presidential
campaign. There are pros and cons to
these different funding schemes, but the
main point is that a basic income is
affordable.
The bigger hurdle may well be the
moral objection, that it is wrong to give
people “something for nothing.”
Wouldn’t this be taxing hard-working
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people to give income to able-bodied
free-riders? Isn’t it better to stick with
our current system of benefits, conditional on a willingness to work? Doesn’t
the social contract include a principle of
reciprocity—that those who receive
from society should, if they are able, give
back by contributing to society?
Responses to this objection are of
two sorts. The first concedes the principle of reciprocity, but argues, pragmatically, that conditionality is not worth
the cost. Most people, if given a modest
basic income, will use it to enable themselves to participate in society. Most will
seek employment in order to have more
than a poverty-level income. Some will
elect to stay at home with children or
aging parents. There is evidence to
support these claims from numerous
experiments with minimum income. A
few may choose to live very simply—in
itself an environmental boon—while
focusing their time on volunteering,
further education, or artistic creativity. If
fears about automation materialize, a
basic income will facilitate work-time
reduction and work sharing (whether or
not these are legislated), so that people
can enjoy greater leisure, rather than
suffer greater insecurity, as the productivity of labor rises. If there are a few
loafers who decide to do nothing or to
take drugs—and let’s face it, the current
system does not prevent this—the
resulting harm is outweighed by the
social benefits of unconditional income
for all.
The second response challenges the
principle of reciprocity by noting that
much of the income in modern capitalist
societies is already decoupled from labor.
Many people inherit wealth and can live
entirely on interest and dividends,
without doing a day’s work in their lives.
(That many of these people do work is a
further answer to those who think
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unconditional income will promote laziness.) Whether you are fortunate enough
to inherit wealth, or have family connections or other advantages of affluence, is
a matter of luck—something that Chris
Hughes (2018) lucidly illustrates from
his own experience.
All that basic income does is
distribute this luck—the unearned
income—more equally, so that everyone
starts out on a more level playing field.
Reciprocity is not rejected; it just comes
into play on the foundation of a more
fundamental principle of guaranteeing
everyone a fair share of assets. Above the
basic income, earned income is distributed in proportion to work (Van Parijs
and Vanderborght 2017).
POSSIBLE NATIONAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL
BASIC-INCOME POLICIES

I

t is not too difficult to imagine a
basic income being adopted at a
national level. After all, in the 1960s
and early1970s, there was support across
the political spectrum for a guaranteed minimum income. Martin Luther
King (1967) endorsed the idea. George
McGovern ran as the Democratic candidate for president favoring a demogrant
(Mound 2016), a kind of guaranteed
minimum income. Libertarian economist Milton Friedman (1962) favored
a negative income tax, a means-tested,
but otherwise unconditional minimum
income. Richard Nixon’s Family
Assistance Plan was a modified version
of Friedman’s proposal, and it passed
the House, but failed to pass in the
Senate (Steensland 2017). Poverty is
still with us, inequality is rising, and
we face new threats from technological
change. Among political parties, the
Green Parties around the world are the
strongest supporters of basic income

•
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(Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017).
But the idea is also favored by social
movements, such as the Movement for
Black Lives (https://policy.m4bl.org
/reparations/). The social conditions are
certainly favorable for a national debate
about basic income.
Are basic-income policy proposals
relevant at the state or local level? Alaska’s
Permanent Fund Dividend illustrates
how states can create dividends from
sovereign wealth funds, or more directly
from taxation of the use of common
assets. But what about resource-poor
states like Maine? Gary Flomenhaft
(2012) calculated that even Vermont,
also a resource-poor state, has enough
resources that, if all the rents were taxed,
and the revenue distributed as dividends,
every citizen could receive between
$1,900 and over $10,000 annually. Of
course, clawing back these resources
after having turned them over to private
companies would face major political
challenges.
A more modest, partial basic income
could be created at the state level in
several ways. A state-level carbon tax,
desirable as a way to reduce fossil-fuel
emissions, could yield a significant
universal dividend, and the dividend
would rectify an otherwise regressive and
unpopular consumption tax. A carbon
tax with progressive tax reductions has
been implemented successfully in British
Columbia (Durning and Bauman 2014).
The earned income tax credit, which
exists at the state as well as the federal
level, could be made refundable. That is,
those without earned income would
receive a credit, increasing their income
when it falls below a minimum. It is
unlikely that refundable tax credits or
carbon taxes at the state level could be
large enough to adequately address
either the environmental requirements
or the income needs, but policies at the
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Clinton, Hilary. 2017. What Happened. New
York: Simon & Schuster.

state level can pave the way for more
adequate policies at the federal level,
when the political environment there
becomes more favorable.
Other policies that could be introduced at the state level are a universal
child allowance or a refundable child tax
credit. Universal child allowances are
minimum incomes that go to all children regardless of means or behavioral
conditions.
Lastly, at the municipal or state
level, pilot projects such as those
discussed earlier can generate public
discussion of minimum-income policies
and empirical evidence to inform policy
making. Any Maine city, particularly
with grant support, could launch similar
experiments. 
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Not Ready for Prime Time: A Response to
“Universal Basic Income: Policy Options at
National, State, and Local Levels”
by Dave Canarie

I

n a recent Maine Policy Review
commentary, “Universal Basic
Income: Policy Options at National,
State and Local Levels,” Professor
Michael W. Howard presents the case
for a universal basic income (UBI) and
suggests it could be tested in Maine.
He writes that there was “support across
the political spectrum for a guaranteed
minimum income” in the 1960s and
1970s (Howard 2018: 40) and suggests
three arguments in favor of UBI: to
address future job loss associated with
artificial intelligence, to fight precarcity,
and to support unremunerated work
such as caring for children or the elderly.
Universal basic income is an idea
that sounds great in theory but struggles
mightily when considered in detail.
According to an article in the New York
Times, former Treasury Secretary Larry
Summers described UBI as “one of those
ideas that the longer you look at it, the
less enthusiastic you become”(“A
Universal Basic Income Is a Poor Tool to
Fight Poverty,” Eduardo Porter, May 31,
2016). That may explain why universal
income proposals were not adopted in
the 1960s, even though it was during the
height of the War on Poverty.
UBI is staggeringly expensive. The
study cited in Howard’s commentary
(Widerquist 2017) lists a total cost for a
nationwide UBI program of $3.415 trillion. This price tag approaches the cost
of all current federal spending, which the
Congressional Budget Office estimates
to be $4.4 trillion for 2019, and it is

virtually equal to the $3.4 trillion
collected by the Internal Revenue Service
for all income taxes in 2017. UBI would
require massive an unprecedented expenditure: its cost is almost as large as the
entire current federal budget and equal
to all current income tax receipts.1
The commentary asserts, “the gross
cost is not very meaningful” (Howard
2018: 39), but of course it is. Professor
Howard claims that the actual cost of the
program is one-sixth of the gross cost, or
$539 billion, because everyone would
receive $12,000 per year ($6,000 for
children), while people with earned
income would pay “a 50 percent tax
surcharge on their income” (Howard
2018: 39). No matter how one funds
it—whether from general revenues, a tax
increase, or a combination of the two—
the program still costs $3.415 trillion.
Additionally, the commentary does not
explain the 50 percent tax surcharge on
all earned income. Is it a flat 50 percent
tax rate for all taxpayers? Is 50 percent
added to existing tax rates? Is the 50
percent tax means tested? Although the
commentary does briefly examine other
ways to fund UBI and other basic income
levels, the costs of UBI are staggering
and will increase every year as the population grows. Moreover, the growth in
UBI cost will become exponential when
the inevitable calls for cost-of-living
adjustments in the annual UBI payout
are adopted.
In pre-empting an argument that
UBI gives people “something for
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nothing,” Howard asserts, “much of the
income in modern capitalist societies is
already decoupled from labor” (Howard
2018: 40). I don’t think that is true for
most people in Maine, however. Even
people who are not actively working, for
example, Social Security and private
pension recipients, receive income that is
directly related to their labor because
they paid FICA tax and made 401k
contributions during their working years.
I also disagree with the claim that
the “advantages of affluence [are often] a
matter of luck” (Howard 2018: 40).
Sometimes they are, but try talking
about luck to a Lewiston physician who
took difficult courses in high school and
college, studied brutally long hours in
medical school, incurred a lot of debt,
and is coming off a 24-hour shift. Try
asking a Bangor CPA about her luck
when she is busy all year and works long
hours during tax season. Try explaining
affluence luck to a small business owner
in Kittery who made all-in personal
commitments of time, energy, money,
and passion to launch and nurture his
business. Most Maine people accumulate wealth through hard work, long
hours, and by saving and investing their
hard-earned money.
The commentary claims that a
universal income “would completely
eliminate poverty for 43 million people,
including 14.5 million children,” and as
a result we could consider “the potential
elimination of other programs, such as
food stamps or Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) benefits, which
might be redundant with basic income”
(Howard 2018: 39). One of my critiques
of Professor Howard’s well-researched
commentary is that it does not consider
the implications of these statements.
If UBI is presented as a way to
completely eliminate poverty, there is no
doubt that our existing social welfare
76
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safety net would be targeted for significant reduction if not elimination. In
fact, existing social programs would
likely be offered up as a way to fund the
cost of UBI. If poverty is eliminated, the
argument would likely go, we can eliminate anti-poverty programs and use the
savings to pay for UBI.
Perhaps a guaranteed income would
adequately replace existing social welfare
programs for the current beneficiaries,
and they won’t lose out in the transition
to UBI. That’s a huge leap of faith,
however, and the migration from the
status quo to UBI is fraught with the risk
that social welfare beneficiaries will be
left with unmet needs as a result of this
complex shift in approaches. Consider,
for example, a person currently receiving
benefits under the TANF and food
stamp programs. If UBI is adopted the
person would likely lose TANF and food
stamp benefits under the approach
described by Professor Howard and, in
exchange, get $12,000 annually.
Meanwhile, someone earning $500,000
a year would also get $12,000 annually
under this proposal. Neither outcome
appears to make sense.
Converting from our current social
welfare program to a UBI is an enormous change, and the risk of program
failure is borne entirely by the poor who
would get a flat, defined-contribution
cash payment on the one hand, but lose
their existing social benefits safety net
on the other. Proponents of UBI face a
monumental challenge in persuading
social welfare providers and recipients
that we should dismantle our poverty
safety net. Social welfare program
managers and recipients will “fight
tooth and nail” to keep programs in
place (Hoar 2018).
The biggest challenge facing UBI is
not mentioned in the article, however:
namely, that spending for this unprece-

dentedly expensive program would likely
preempt funding for other proposed
programs that enjoy perhaps even more
public support than UBI. UBI would
preempt funding for a national health
insurance program, for example, which
is a very expensive program. Some estimates suggest that Bernie Sanders’s
Medicare for All plan would cost $33
trillion by 2031 (proponents of the plan
say it would save $2 trillion). Spending
for UBI could conflict with attempts to
address the $1.5 trillion in college debt
that burden graduates for decades after
they leave school or with proposals for
free college tuition, which could cost
$70 billion each year, or with job-producing infrastructure repairs ($2 trillion), budget deficit reduction, or social
security reform.2
The issue of competing priorities is
the greatest challenge faced by proponents of UBI because it means they need
to justify: (1) a historic government cost
expenditure and (2) the reason UBI
should be preferred over other worthy
and well-supported programs competing
for government funding.
In my opinion, proposals to implement UBI nationwide face nearly insurmountable political, financial, and social
hurdles. Moreover, the logistics of
implementing UBI—whether the transition in which UBI replaces existing
safety net programs or the mechanics of
UBI financing—are overwhelmingly
complex and have not been adequately
explained in the commentary. Although
preparing for potential future job losses,
reducing precarity, and rewarding
unpaid labor are all important issues
that we need to address, other policy
options, such as a negative income tax,
could be as effective as UBI at addressing
them. That said, well-developed and
transparent localized experiments may
be worth pursuing to gather data points
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on UBI and to inform the ongoing
discussion. National UBI, however, is
not ready for prime time. ENDNOTES
1. CBO figures are available here: https://
www.cbo.gov/topics/budget; IRS figures
are from the IRS Data Book: https://www.
irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax
-stats-irs-data-book.
2. Information on the figures cited in this
paragraph is from the following sources:
Medicare for All: Jeff Stein, “Does Bernie
Sanders’s Health Plan Cost $33 Trillion—
or Save $2 Trillion?” Washington Post (July
31, 2018), https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/; student
loans: https://www.forbes.com/sites
/zackfriedman/2018/06/13/student-loan
-debt-statistics-2018/#4d07c5b7310f; free
college tuition: https://www
.sanders.senate.gov/download
/collegeforallsummary/; infrastructure:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30
/us/politics/trump-infrastructure-plan
.html.
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Technological Change and Universal
Basic Income:
A Historical Review
by Daniel Soucier

I

magine being born in 1900. With great genes, avoidance
of major diseases as well as industrial accidents, and a
little bit of luck, you lived to see the year 2000. What
technological changes did you experience over the course
of your lifetime? You would have witnessed overwhelming
developments in transportation, construction, manufacturing, and communication. Further, after the First World
War, you would have watched as chemical, electrical, petroleum, and steel technologies revolutionizing workplaces
and marketplaces. How did the workforce change? What
careers were no longer viable? What jobs no longer existed?
How many hundreds of millions of people were displaced
due to technological change and increased automation?
As an instructor of history and Maine studies, I often
hear students exclaim that the world is more “modern” than
ever before, that the technological changes occurring since
the dawning of the twenty-first century supersede all that
have come throughout the history of humankind. That
despite vast cultural, social, political, economic, and environmental revolutions, the changes most significant to
human history are the ones that have occurred during their
lifetimes. However, eminent historians of technology
Howard Segal and Alan Marcus argue that “the century
after the 1830s [that] marked America’s technological
heyday.” The technological changes that occurred from
1830 to 1930 created vast social and cultural change in
America. That change still permeates the United States
today as “Americans...continue to live with and employ
variants of technologies first developed more than a
hundred years ago” (Marcus and Segal 1999: vii).
This perceived unprecedented rapidity of change
occurring in one’s own lifetime is akin to the principal of
shifting-baseline syndrome that occurred in fisheries
management: instead of thinking about levels of oceanic
biota before human exploitation as natural, individuals
think about how fish stocks have changed during their
lifetimes. Thus, each generation of fishermen and fishery
scientists redefined what is normal, natural, or sustainable.
In the past, policymakers relied on the anecdotes of those
working the seas and the reports of biologists compiled
from misinterpreted data resulting in disastrous consequences. Oftentimes, the supporters of universal basic
income fall victim to shifting-baseline syndrome as well. As
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Michael Howard points out “supporters of basic income…
worry that artificial intelligence and automation will
displace more jobs than they will create necessitating new
forms of income security for those who are displaced”
(Howard 2018: 38). Indeed, the argument is that the
changes wrought by artificial intelligence will be so great
that Maine, the United States, and the world need to revolutionize their social safety-net systems.
MAINE: A HISTORY OF DISPLACED PROFESSIONS.

T

he rise of artificial intelligence and increased automation creates incredible workforce challenges. However,
to think that this change is unique is ahistorical. In fact,
since the revolution from an agrarian-based economy to an
industrial-based economy, the recurrent fear has been that
technological change will produce mass unemployment
followed by social upheaval. Maine is an excellent case study
for how disruptive technologies displace workers, but, in
some cases, can create unforeseen economic opportunities.
By the mid-eighteenth century, Maine’s lumbering,
shipbuilding, and fishing industries were among the top in
the nation. The agricultural sector of the economy was the
largest in New England. Ice-cutting employed tens of thousands of workers and created more wealth in its peak years
than the annual gold production in California. Maine also
supplied the most granite in the country for curbing and
paving and was second only to Massachusetts in granite
supplied for the nation’s booming urban regions in the
aftermath of the Civil War. However, these multimillion-dollar industries were on the verge of collapse during
the early twentieth century as the nation shifted from an
economy based on wood, water, and muscle to one fueled
by iron, coal, and rail.
Railroads opened up the state of Maine and the rest of
New England for the importation of agricultural products,
manufactured goods, and natural resources from the
western United States. This forced many of Maine farmers
out of business or caused them to specialize in a single
product such as potatoes, dairy, or hay. As overland shipping became more efficient and the predominant construction materials for ships evolved from wood to iron or steel,
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Maine’s shipbuilding industry also was forced to specialize
or risk becoming extinct. Steel and rail also caused great
decline in Maine’s granite industry. Buildings became
constructed from steel and concrete and roads from
macadam. Further, granite quarried from western states
flooded the eastern market on rail cars reducing demand
for Maine’s coastal granite. Finally, with the rise of electrification and the ability to produce ice and cool foodstuffs
artificially, Maine’s ice industry collapsed. Thus, the rise of
rail and steel transformed Maine’s economic landscape.
However, the spread of interior railways and travel
aboard steamships had unexpected consequences for the
region. In the aftermath of the Civil War, industrial elites
and middle-class professionals gained increased leisure
time, and they looked to an extended pleasure periphery to
escape the hassles of urban life. Hotels, cottages, restaurants, and other service industry establishments dotted the
coast of Maine as well as inland lakes and resort communities. Mount Desert Island, Rangeley Lakes, and Moosehead
Lake became destinations for hunting, fishing, camping,
and cottaging. Early in the twentieth century, Maine began
billing itself as the nation’s vacationland. Summer hotels,
country inns, strip malls, factory outlets, summer camps,
campgrounds, ski resorts, and expanded tourism communities were fueled by the variegated recreational opportunities available to visitors of the state. By the 1990s, visitors
were spending over $2 billion, and tourism became one of
Maine’s most important economic and cultural sectors.
Today, tourism is Maine’s most vibrant industry generating
$3.42 billion in revenue annually. In fact, visitors contribute
one in five dollars to Maine’s economy, support one in six
Maine jobs, and generate 20 percent of Maine’s gross state
product. The same disruptive technologies that bankrupted much of Maine’s extractive resource industries
directly laid the foundation for its new service economy.

been crafted through decades of experience with workforce
displacement—where failure is the burden of those in
society with the least amount of political, social, and
economic resources—based upon the fact that technology
is changing would be misguided policy (Howard 2018:
40). It is clear that the transition will be painful; however,
through innovation and persistence, Mainers will make it
through this next economic and technological revolution.
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CONCLUSION

I certainly agree with Howard that “poverty is still
with us [and] inequality is rising.” Indeed, I am no stranger
to displaced workers in the face of a globalized economy,
increased automation, and a changing workforce dynamic.
I often joke with friends and colleagues that I earned my
PhD in history because I am a fourth-generation papermaker who crafts papers intellectually instead of materially
because my familial vocation no longer exists. Nearly the
entirety of my immediate and extended family has experienced job displacement and the benefits of our social
welfare safety net. Despite a massive economic shift from
an industrial-based economy to a service-based economy
during the twentieth century, Maine’s unemployment rate
as of August 2019 was 2.9 percent. Thus, I also agree with
Howard that “we face new threats from technological
change;” however, overhauling social programs that have
12
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A Basic Income Guarantee Cannot Secure
Either the Right to Work or Income Security
Recognized in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights—
But There Is a Strategy That Can at Far Lower Cost
By Philip Harvey

A

s a human rights economist and lawyer, my work
is dedicated to the development of public policy
proposals capable of securing the economic and social rights
recognized in international human rights agreements (UN
OHCHR n.d.). From that perspective, the problem I have
with universal basic income (UBI) guarantee proposals is
that their advocates overstate their ability to secure the right
to work and the right to income security recognized in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (UN
General Assembly 1948) while failing to acknowledge the
opportunity cost of either the full or partial versions of the
UBI guarantee they promote.
INABILITY OF UBI GUARANTEE TO
SECURE THE RIGHT TO WORK OR THE
RIGHT TO INCOME SECURITY

T

he arguments Michael Howard (2018) proposes in
favor of a UBI guarantee focus on the inability of
market economies to secure various aspects of the right to
work recognized in Article 23 of the UDHR. He cites three
such failings—the threat of robotization to the economy’s
ability to provide paid employment for all job wanters,
the inadequate pay and precarity of a substantial portion
of existing jobs, and the lack of compensation provided
volunteer family care and community service workers. He
suggests that a UBI guarantee would solve these problems.
I have long argued that it would not (Harvey 2005, 2006,
2008, 2013a, 2014).
What UBI advocates fail to note is that the uniformity,
universality, and unconditionality of a UBI guarantee
prevents it from providing any compensation to persons
who suffer involuntary unemployment, inadequate wages,
or a lack of compensation for socially useful unpaid work.
Consider two workers. Call them Mary and James. Both
work at the same job, receive the same after-tax wages and
the same untaxed UBI grant. If Mary is laid off, she will
continue to receive the same UBI grant that James does.
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The only difference between them is that Mary will have
lost 100 percent of her after-tax wage income without her
UBI grant providing a penny of compensation for that
loss—since she received the same UBI benefit in addition
to her wage while she was employed, as John still does
because he still has his job. Nor will Mary receive a penny
of compensation from her UBI grant for any community
service or family care work she performs—since her UBI
grant would be the same whether or not she engages in any
such work. Finally, the same would be true of low-wage
workers, since they too would receive the same UBI grant
regardless of how adequately or inadequately they were
paid. This does not mean Mary’s UBI guarantee would be
worthless. It would permit her to survive without a decent
job, and that would undoubtedly be of value to her, but it
wouldn’t secure her right to a decent job if she wanted one
to supplement her UBI income or to be fairly compensated
for the socially useful work she performed.
Would her UBI guarantee secure her right to an
adequate income guaranteed by Article 25 of the UDHR?
That would depend on the level at which the UBI guarantee was set, whether it compensated for the possibly
higher than average cost of living where she lived, whether
it allowed for additional payments based on any exceptional
needs she might have (due to a disability, for example), and
whether it was adequate to secure the right (also recognized
in Article 25) to “security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond [her] control.”
I think it’s clear that a UBI guarantee would fail to
satisfy all these conditions. On the other hand, there’s no
reason why a single program should be expected to do so.
The problem with a UBI guarantee is that the opportunity
cost of providing such a guarantee—whether at a full or
partial level—is so high that it would preclude the provision of other social welfare benefits needed to fully realize
not just the right to work and an adequate income, but all
of the economic and social rights recognized in the UDHR.
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THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF
PROVIDING A UBI GUARANTEE

O

pportunity cost is an economic concept that measures
the value of the choices we make by comparing them
to the alternative choices we forgo. No policy proposal
should be rejected on the grounds that it only partially
fulfills a human rights mandate, but it should be rejected
if other policies would do a better job of fulfilling those
mandates at lower cost. In general, the greater the cost of
a policy proposal, the greater its opportunity cost, and this
is certainly true of UBI guarantee proposals.
In the United States, a UBI guarantee matching the
official poverty threshold for one person households would
cost about $3.7 trillion in 2019 while generating no more
than about $400 billion in savings from reductions in
existing means-tested social welfare benefits. The net cost
of such a program, (about $3.3 trillion) would require an
increase in federal spending from its current $4.4 trillion
level to $7.7 trillion.
A UBI guarantee based on the 60 percent of median
income threshold used by the European Union to count
persons “at risk of poverty or social exclusion” (Eurostat
2019) would cost about twice as much while generating
about 1 trillion in savings from the elimination of virtually
all means-tested social welfare benefits, including most
Medicaid and SCHIP benefits. With a net cost of about
$6.4 trillion, this more generous (and arguably more
adequate) UBI guarantee would require an increase in
federal spending from its current $4.4 trillion level to
$10.8 trillion.
These figures are daunting, but the point I want to
make is not that a full UBI guarantee is currently unattainable. I think it’s fair to say that UBI advocates who have
studied the issue in depth concede that it is (Van Parijs and
Vanderborght 2017: 133–169). The point I want to make
is that the opportunity cost of providing a UBI guarantee
argues against the adoption of either a full or partial
guarantee.
Before arguing that point, though, I want to comment
on the claim advanced by many UBI advocates that the
cost of a UBI guarantee shown above (its budgeted cost less
savings attributable to reductions in social welfare benefits
replaced by the guarantee) is not the relevant measure of its
cost for purposes of policy assessment. They argue that the
more relevant measure is the net redistributional effect of a
UBI guarantee—the amount of income that would actually be transferred from wealthier to less wealthy members
of society after the netting out of UBI grants against additional tax liabilities linked to the program. They refer to
this redistributive effect as a UBI guarantee’s “net cost.”
José Noguera (2018) has discussed the conceptual problems with this argument. Because of space limitations, I
will merely add that the argument is about how people
14

should think and feel about the cost of a UBI guarantee
rather than what a government would have to pay out of
its treasury to fund such a benefit. That cost is accurately
reflected in the above figures and is not in dispute.
AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

A

ssessing the opportunity cost of a policy proposal
requires the identification of possible alternatives to
it. The alternative I have long advocated (Harvey 1989)
is specifically targeted at securing the right to work and
income security recognized in the UDHR by means of a
two-legged strategy originally proposed by New Deal social
welfare planners (CES 1935). As originally conceived, the
first leg of the strategy called for the federal government
to provide “employment assurance” to all able-bodied
adults backed up by a promise of “public employment for
those…whom industry cannot employ at a given time.”
The second leg of their strategy called for the federal
government, in cooperation with the states, to provide
truly adequate, nonstigmatizing income transfers to those
members of society who were either unable or not expected
to be self-supporting.
The first leg of this strategy was successfully tested,
though not fully implemented, in programs like the
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and Works Progress
Administration (WPA) (Harvey 2013b). Work on the
second leg of the strategy was commenced in the 1930s
and has advanced considerably since then in the development non-means-tested programs like Social Security
(OASDI) and means-tested programs like Supplemental
Security Income (SSI).
Add to this two-legged strategy a similar commitment
to secure everyone’s right to education and healthcare, and
you have a four-legged policy capable of securing all of the
most costly economic and social entitlements recognized in
the UDHR. Call them the HEWI rights—health care,
education, work and income security.
It is important to note, however, that the ability of this
four-legged policy to achieve its human rights goals
depends on the realization of all four HEWI rights. They
are interdependent, and a failure to secure any of them
would undermine the entire strategy. Today, inadequate
funding and structural inequities stand in our way of
securing everyone’s right to health care, education, and
income security, but human rights advocates at least have a
credible strategy for securing those three rights. What’s
missing is a credible strategy for securing the right to work
(Harvey 2007). That’s the gap an updated version of the
New Deal’s employment assurance strategy could fill, and
legislation embodying that strategy has been introduced in
Congress (H.R. 1000).
At an average cost of $320 billion per year, H.R. 1000
would cost only 5 percent to 10 percent as much as a UBI
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guarantee—before taking into account the additional tax
revenues and savings in other social welfare programs a job
guarantee would generate. Add a few hundred billion
dollars to the budgets of a select set of income-transfer
programs, and we could also guarantee a truly adequate
minimum income for everyone who is either unable or not
expected to be self-supporting. In short, for 10 percent to
20 percent of what a UBI guarantee would cost (depending
on the level of the guarantee) it would be possible to
achieve what a UBI guarantee cannot—the substantial
realization of the right to work and income security recognized in the UDHR.
Moreover, since the benefits provided by a partial UBI
guarantee would be proportionate to its cost, a partial
guarantee costing the same as the employment assurance
and income security strategy described above would
provide a UBI grant of only about $2,500 a year—a little
more than $200 a month. Stated differently, the opportunity cost of providing a UBI guarantee of $200 a month at
a cost of about $600 billion a year would be to forego the
chance of guaranteeing a decent job for everyone who
wants one and an adequate income for everyone who
either cannot or is not expected to be self-supporting. That
opportunity cost is far too high, in my view, to justify a
partial UBI guarantee, and the same assessment applies to
a full UBI guarantee. That’s why I oppose UBI guarantee
proposals of the sort advocated by the Basic Income
Guarantee Network (BIEN n.d.) and Michael Howard. A
UBI guarantee that was integrated into the UDHR
strategy described above by providing a means-tested UBI
benefit to persons who could be self-supporting but elected
not to seek paid employment would be another proposition (Harvey 2005: 43–45).
REFERENCES
BIEN. n.d. “What is Basic Income?” https://basicincome.org/
basic-income/
CES (Committee on Economic Security). 1935. Report to the
President. Washington: US Government Printing Office. https://
www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces.html
Eurostat. 2019. “People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion.”
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion
Harvey, Philip. 1989. Securing the Right to Employment: Social
Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the United States.
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Harvey, Philip. 2005. “The Right to Work and Basic Income
Guarantees: Competing or Complementary Goals?” Rutgers
Journal of Law and Public Policy 2(1): 8. https://rutgerspolicyjournal.org/volume-2-issue-1

MAINE POLICY PERSPECTIVES—UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME

Harvey, Philip. 2006. “The Relative Cost of a Universal Basic Income
and a Negative Income Tax.” Basic Income Studies 1(2): Article
6. https://njfac.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/The-RelativeCost-of-a-UBI-and-NIT-2006-1.pdf
Harvey, Philip. 2007. “Benchmarking the Right to Work.” In
Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement and Policy Issues,
edited by Alanson Minkler and Shareen Hartel, 115–141. New
York: Cambridge University Press. https://njfac.org/wp-content
/uploads/2018/05/Benchmarking-the-Right-to-Work-2007.pdf
Harvey, Philip. 2008. “Is There a Progressive Alternative to
Conservative Welfare Reform.” Georgetown Journal on Poverty
Law and Policy 15(2): 157–208. https://njfac.org/wp-content
/uploads/2018/05/Is-There-A-Progressive-Alternative-to
-Conservative-Welfare-Reform-2008-1.pdf
Harvey, Philip. 2013a. “More for Less: The Job Guarantee Strategy.”
Basic Income Studies 7(2): 3–18. https://njfac.org/wp-content
/uploads/2018/05/More-for-Less-2013-1.pdf
Harvey, Philip. 2013b. “The New Deal’s Direct Job Creation
Strategy: Providing Employment Assurance for American
Workers.” In When Government Helped: Learning from the
Successes and Failures of the New Deal, edited by Sheila D.
Collins and Gertrude S. Goldberg, 146–179. New York: Oxford
University Press. https://njfac.org/wp-content
/uploads/2018/05/The-New-Deals-Direct-Job-Creation
-Strategy-Providing-Employment-Assurance-for-American
-Workers-2013.pdf
Harvey, Philip. 2014. “Securing the Right to Work and Income
Security.” In Activation Policies for the Unemployed, the Right
to Work and the Duty to Work, edited by Daniel Dumont and
Elise Dermine, 223–254. Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang. https://
njfac.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Securing-the-Right
-to-Work-and-Income-Security-2014.pdf
Howard, Michael W. 2018. “Universal Basic Income; Policy Options
at National, State, and Local Levels.” Maine Policy Review 27(2):
38–42. https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr/vol27
/iss2/5/
Noguera, Jose. 2018. “What is the ‘Net Cost’ of a Basic Income?
Some Conceptual Problems.” Basic Income Earth Network.
https://basicincome.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/What
-is-the-Net-Cost-of-a-Basic-Income-1.pdf
UN General Assembly. 1948. “Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.” https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration
-human-rights/
UN OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights).
no date. “What Are Human Rights.” https://www.ohchr.org
/EN/Pages/Home.aspx
Van Parijs, Philippe, and Yannick Vanderborght. 2017. Basic
Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane
Economy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Philip Harvey is an economist who focuses on human rights and
is one of the world’s foremost authorities on the right to work. A
professor of law at Rutgers University, his research focuses on
public policy options for securing economic and social human
rights, with a particular emphasis on the right to work.

15

Deceptively Simple:
The Uselessness of Gross Cost in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Universal Basic Income
by Georg Arndt and Karl Widerquist

T

Income / Tax ($ '000)

he gross cost of universal basic income (UBI) is a
anything. This program has a gross (and net) cost of
deceptively simple concept: the size of the UBI times
$10,000. To cover this cost, the state taxes Contributor
the size of the population.1 The net cost of UBI is more
(e.g., through an income tax of 25 percent). In the resulting
difficult to calculate: it is the amount of money the UBI
distribution, Beneficiary has a disposable income of
transfers from one group of people (net contributors) to
$10,000 while Contributor retains a disposable income of
another group of people (net beneficiaries) plus any asso$30,000. This example is illustrated in Figure 1.
ciated transaction costs.
The same distribution of disposable income can be
The difference between these two concepts came up in
achieved with a UBI of $10,000 payable to everyone. Such
a pair of recent Maine Policy Review commentaries by
a scheme would have a gross cost of $20,000 or double the
Dave Canarie and Michael Howard. Canarie responds to
means-tested system because both Beneficiary and
Howard’s argument that gross cost is not very meaningful
Contributor receive the UBI of $10,000 on paper. To
by simply asserting “but of course it is,” with little or no
finance this scheme, the government could impose, for
argument to back it up (Canarie 2019: 76).
example, an income tax of 50 percent on Contributor,
This article demonstrates that, despite Canarie’s assertaxing away $20,000 of their market income. In total,
tion, gross cost is a misleading concept that does not reflect
however, this UBI scheme leads to the same income distrithe actual cost to society of a UBI scheme, mainly because
bution as the means-tested system above: Beneficiary ends
gross costs do not account for the substantial amounts of
up with $10,000 and Contributor retains $30,000. There is
UBI that people pay to themselves. It neither benefits nor
no difference between the financial costs and benefits to the
costs you anything if the government both adds and
two parties even though the gross cost is twice as high. In
subtracts a dollar to and from your bank account—even if
contrast, the net cost of the UBI scheme remains $10,000—
the addition is called “UBI” and the subtraction is called a
the same as the cost of the means-tested program—
“tax.” The difference between what you pay and what you
reflecting the similarity of the costs and benefits of the two
receive determines whether and by how much you benefit
programs. This similarity in outcomes is illustrated in
from or pay for a UBI. This difference is the net cost. It is
Figure 2.
the true cost of UBI because it reflects how much one
group of people has to sacrifice and
how much another group benefits.
Figure 1: Illustration of Means-tested Benefit System
The gross cost can easily be threeto-six times larger than the net cost
30
of UBI, and therefore, it can be an
extremely misleading representation
of the cost of UBI (Widerquist
20
2017).
To illustrate the difference,
$ 30
Market
10
consider the following stylised
Income
society with two individuals—one
$ 10
of them (Net Beneficiary) is unem0
ployed while the other (Net
$ 10
Contributor) receives an annual
market income of $40,000. Suppose
-10
there is a simple means-tested
benefit system under which
-20
Beneficiary receives $10,000 while
Contributor does not receive
Net Beneficiary
Net Contributor
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Figure 2: Illustration of UBI Scheme Equivalent to the Means-tested
Benefit System in Figure 1

Income / Tax ($ '000)

The gross cost of UBI is independent of the tax rate on net beneficiaries, and therefore it cannot
capture any of these changes or
30
contribute to a discussion of them.
Therefore, it is unable to capture the
$ 10
distributional effects of the UBI
20
scheme. Cost figures for distributional programs are meaningless if
they cannot show what the financial
10
$ 20
burden is or who remains to bear
$ 10
Market
that burden after beneficiaries are
0
accounted for.
Income
To the extent that Canarie
$
20
elaborates
on his statement that
-10
gross cost is “of course” meaningful,
he writes that the government does
-20
have to raise the taxes to pay for the
whole UBI. This statement is true
Net Beneficiary
Net Contributor
only in the narrowest sense. While
nominally the cost of a UBI scheme
corresponds to its gross cost, this
In addition to the amount payable, the difference
cost
figure
reflects
neither
the scheme’s cost to society nor
between gross and net cost is also affected by the tax rate
its
effect
on
the
disposable
income
of net contributors. The
on net beneficiaries. Very few UBI net beneficiaries have
government
increases
taxes,
but
gives
the money back,
zero private income and pay zero taxes. When they do pay
making
that
portion
of
the
tax
increase
costless.
Fouksman
taxes, they pay some of the cost of their own UBI. To illusand
Saxe
(2019)
offer
a
mathematical
proof
that the
trate this, consider the same example as above; but now
marginal
tax
rates
needed
to
support
UBI
are
identical
to
Beneficiary receives an additional market income of
those
necessary
to
support
an
otherwise
equivalent
means$6,000. Depending on the income tax rate for Beneficiary
tested negative income tax scheme. Because gross cost
(which effectively serves as a withdrawal rate for the UBI),
reveals nothing about the total tax burden or the marginal
the net cost of the scheme will vary while the gross cost will
tax rates necessary to support a UBI scheme, it adds
remain at $20,000. In the example above, setting the
nothing meaningful to any conversation about UBI.
income tax rate for Beneficiary at 33 percent would imply
Unless one wants to exaggerate the cost of UBI to
2
a net cost of $8,660 to be borne by Contributor.
make
it seem unattainable, the primary allure of the gross
The income tax rate for net beneficiaries not only
cost
lies
in its simplicity. The net cost of UBI is far more
impacts the net cost of the scheme, it also sets the breakdifficult
to
calculate (doing so involves specifying tax rates
even point at which individuals move from being net
and
looking
at their effects on people at all levels of income
beneficiaries to being net contributors. Extending the
and
wealth).
But this additional complexity is necessary,
example from the previous paragraph, an income tax rate
because
as
this
article has demonstrated, any meaningful
of 33 percent for net beneficiaries sets the break-even point
cost-benefit
analysis
of UBI has to consider the true finan3
at a market income of $30,000.
cial
cost
of
the
UBI
(who is financially harmed by the
Considering net beneficiaries’ tax rate also illustrates
transition
and
by
how
much) or the true financial benefit
one of the main advantages of the net cost perspective over
of
UBI
(who
financially
gains from the transition to UBI).
the gross cost perspective: it allows us to investigate distriOnly
the
net
cost
can
tell
us something meaningful for this
butional effects within the UBI scheme. If we increase the
comparison.
tax rate on net beneficiaries, people reach the break-even
point sooner; there will be fewer net beneficiaries; the cost
of UBI decreases; and more net contributors would be
available to share that cost. Therefore, the financial burden
on each of the net contributors would also decrease.
Similarly, if we decrease the tax rate, the net benefit and net
cost increase; there are more net beneficiaries; and fewer
net contributors to pay the cost.
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ENDNOTES
1

If the UBI grant differs between adults and children, the
gross cost is (still very simply) the number of adults times the
UBI for adults plus the number of children times the UBI for
children.

2

It is important to point out that, when integrating a UBI
scheme into an existing social security system, this additional income tax for net beneficiaries would be levied on top
of any other tax burden net beneficiaries are already facing.

3

At a market income of $30,000 and a beneficiary’s tax rate
of 33 percent, the beneficiary would contribute exactly their
own UBI of $10,000 and would consequently break even on
the scheme.
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Restoring the Social Contract:
The Challenge of Meeting Maine Residents Basic Needs
by Luisa Deprez

M

illions of Americans and tens of thousands of Mainers
are able to meet their most basic needs—food,
shelter, health care, heat—only with the help of government programs when their income falls short. This support
has been foundational to the American political system
since Thomas Jefferson embedded the social contract—
Americans rights—into the Declaration of Independence.
“Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” established an
implicit agreement among members of society to cooperate
for their mutual benefit; social investment was essential to
securing the mutual protection and well-being of the citizenry, to ensuring a sound and vibrant democracy.
Today, economic inequality is at a 50-year high.1
Millions are unable to eke out a living putting themselves,
their children, and the nation in a precarious and untenable
position. And current federal attacks on safety-net programs
reveal swiftly eroding government supports, destined to
leave more people even worse off than they are now.
Maine’s economy has had a rocky decade. During the
2008–2009 recession, Maine lost over 30,000 payroll jobs
mostly in the manufacturing, construction, and retail
sectors of the economy, and it was among the last of the
states to recover. The recovery that did occur resulted in an
increase primarily in service-sector jobs—jobs that rarely
offer benefits and usually few opportunities for advancement. Recent analyses from the Department of Labor
projects a flat growth rate over the next 10 years. In a state
with a 13 percent poverty rate, this is sobering news.
Mainers are hard-working, self-reliant individuals. But
even those with full-time jobs struggle to earn enough to
put healthy and adequate food on the table, house their
families, and keep themselves and their families warm and
healthy. Among Mainers, as is the case nationally, 50
percent of residents are just $500 away from an emergency,
and over 40 percent cannot handle an unexpected $400
expense in a given year.2 In addition, a shortage of 20,086
affordable and available rental homes for the 40,839
extremely low-income households in the state leaves too
many forced to decide which of their basic needs are more
important than the others as they struggle to keep eviction
at bay.3 Maine’s average median household income
($53,024) is now about $10,000 below the national average
($63,179).4 Income is just not keeping up with the basic
needs of too many Maine families.
Relying on social safety-net programs to meet basic
fundamental needs is no one’s first choice. But if safety-net
MAINE POLICY PERSPECTIVES—UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME

programs are eliminated or so severely restricted that they
are unusable by the people who need them, then what?
The discussion of how to meet the basic needs of the
citizenry could not have come at a more timely moment
both statewide and nationally. As we near a crisis of unprecedented despair, the questions for Maine right now are,
how does the state ensure fundamental support, especially
for its most vulnerable citizens? What long-range strategy
can reduce poverty and lessen economic and racial inequality
to ensure a more stable, secure populace?
POVERTY AND PROSPECTS FOR
RECOVERY IN MAINE

M

aine is by no means a wealthy state: 12.55 percent
of citizens (approximately 163,000) are poor, 14
percent of children in the state are poor.5 While data
recently released by the US Census Bureau report a
minuscule decrease in the national poverty rate, the Maine
rate actually increased slightly from 2017 to 2018.6 US
Census Bureau data also shows Maine as having the largest
percentage drop in median household income in the
United States—a 3.3 percent drop since 2017.7 Living with
any degree of certainty or security at poverty level ($25,750
for a family of four or $12,490 for a single person) is nigh
impossible.
Further adding to Maine’s challenge to secure stability
for its citizens are the wide variations within the state; here
averages often mean little.8 When the numbers are broken
down by age, race, and geography, inequality immediately
surfaces. In York County, for instance, the poverty rate for
children under five was 7 percent in 2016, below the statewide average of 19.1 percent and the national rate of 21.3
percent. But in Aroostook County, more than a third—37
percent—of very young children live in a household where
the income is below poverty level.9 Sharp regional disparities in childhood poverty are also evident between congressional districts: 9 percent in the 1st congressional district
and 20 percent in the 2nd district.10 These sharp disparities
are also evident among race: the poverty rate among black
children (53 percent) is more than three times the rate for
non-Hispanic white children (15 percent) and twice as high
as that of Hispanic children (25 percent) in Maine. For
American Indian children in Maine, the rate stands at 40.6
percent.11
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The decline in manufacturing also presents considerable challenges as it has increased numbers of prime-age
males out of work and lowered family incomes. While
recent reports show an increase in the number of single
mothers entering the workforce, they are doing so with
limited education and limited help from rapidly fraying
safety-net programs. They often enter low-wage jobs that
offer little, or often no, opportunities for advancement and
few, if any, benefits. Estimates are that nationally 41
percent of women are breadwinners; in Maine 48 percent
are—the seventh highest rate in the country.12 And wage
gaps are still solidly evident between male and female
workers.
Labor force participation, the measure of the number
of people either working or actively looking for work, has
also begun to slip in parts of Maine. In what economists
would consider a full-employment economy, an estimated
20,000 Maine workers are officially unemployed. A more
expansive definition used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimates that over 35,000 Maine workers are discouraged
from seeking work because of repeated refusals to hire,
health conditions, prison records, and various other forms
of discrimination or are working in part-time employment
but seeking full time work. And the lack of affordable child
care makes it especially tough for Mainers—particularly in
rural parts of the state—to work at all.13
While indicators such as rates of employment and
GDP growth are readily held up as measures of economic
stability and growth, they also obscure the fact that
millions of Americans are barely getting by in today’s structurally unequal economy. Maine Center for Economic
Policy (MECEP) data14 shows that seven of the ten state
senate districts with the highest percentage of households
receiving food assistance, for example, experienced negative economic growth over the past twelve years. The types
of economic opportunities that can sustain families and
lead individuals on a path to self-sufficiency are simply not
available in many of these areas because of economic dislocation, globalization, and the decline of good-paying
manufacturing jobs. The households in these areas rely
disproportionately on social safety-net programs. And if, as
the Trump administration has proposed, those programs
are decimated, then what?
HOW DOES MAINE ADDRESS THIS CHALLENGE?

O

nly a few policy ideas have the potential to disrupt
the inequality gap and ensure a greater degree of
equity. Among them are a direct cash payment system and
other direct cash benefit programs, tax rebates and credits,
universal basic income and unconditional cash transfers to
state residents, expanded safety net programs, child care
and food supplement programs, and the like.
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One option now on the table is universal basic income
(UBI). First introduced in the 1960s by President Richard
Nixon, it is not, contrary to popular belief, a new idea.
UBI has gained attention in policy circles, and field
demonstrations have been mounted worldwide including
in Alaska; Ontario; Finland; Stockton, California; and
Jackson, Mississippi. Its promise, as a route for Maine to
consider, will depend on how it is presented, how it is
designed, and what the public narrative is.
Experts who have studied UBI for decades say that if
everyone had a sound, reliable economic floor and did not
have to worry about meeting the bare necessities, we would
see healthy communities. Communities where people
don’t have to work themselves to death, with decreased
levels of stress and anxiety and increased levels of health
and mental health, higher levels of civic engagement, and
better-performing citizens. Overall, we would see a
more-prosperous, highly functional, educated, healthy, and
diverse society.
In Stockton, California, for example, an expert team
is investigating an array of potential outcomes from work
efforts to health, civic engagement to financial wellbeing.
Implicit in their pilot is the idea that individuals can be
trusted to make the best financial decisions for themselves
and their families. The idea is to provide an income floor
so people can actually raise themselves up, use it as a
springboard to lessen the effects of deep-rooted racial and
economic inequalities.
As someone who has devoted her work, teaching,
scholarship, and service to poverty reduction and resolution for over 50 years now, I embraced Nixon’s portion of
a universal basic income when few others did. I have
certainly not abandoned it as a sound public policy; it is
worthy of the utmost attention. Its weightiness arises when
we consider its implementation and assess its cost: Would
or should income limits be imposed on participants, and if
so, how would they be determined? How should participants be identified? Must citizenship be a requirement for
participation? Should safety-net programs now in place be
abolished or significantly reduced? Where does the money
to fund it come from? How should the wealth gap be
considered in determining individual allocations? Should
there be an established national minimum amount for each
person or does this decision get turned over to the states?
As ideological divides become sharper and as history would
remind us, the negative ramifications of this latter approach
have been devastating.
And lest we forget, there are the irreverent voices of
naysayers who attach themselves to mythical, unsubstantiated notions of deservedness, hard work, and personal
responsibility. As they endlessly raise concerns about laziness, irresponsible behavior, and dependency, their opinions permeate and disrupt the political discourse—as they
have for decades—despite the plethora of studies, research,
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and data that belie their claims. But they, too, are a force
to be reckoned with—and educated—as these conversations begin.
Importantly though, we have in front of us a big idea
that we must now de-risk. Meeting basic human needs is
at stake. Above all else, any effort to secure basic needs for
Maine citizens must do no harm; the poorest among us
must not be made any worse off than they already are.
To this end, we would be remiss in continuing to
reject UBI as a serious policy, singly or coupled with other
policies, which might ensure the stability of Maine citizens. We cannot once again fail in upholding the tenets of
the social contract. The contention that it is “not yet ready
for prime time” fails to consider that income inequality is
growing dramatically, and to date, no other set of programs
has yet worked particularly well.
Moving people out of poverty toward self-sufficiency
and financial stability is a goal we can all agree on. How to
best provide the support people need to meet the demands
of daily living—that is the question. The newly established
Committee to Study the Feasibility of Creating Basic
Income Security is Maine’s opportunity to answer that
question. It will be a challenging task, but through a
rigorous review of the literature on basic needs and UBI, as
well as an analysis of current research, data, and best practices, it can provide the state with a pathway by which it
can secure the basic needs of Maine residents. Bringing the
state closer to ensuring that the basic needs of its residents
are met will be a laudable and vital contribution.
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The Ethical Commitment of a Universal
Basic Income
by Almaz Zelleke

M

ichael Howard’s (2018) brief commentary presents
several arguments in favor of a universal basic income
and describes the ways it could be implemented at the
state level. The objections to basic income argued by Dave
Canarie (2019) center on its high cost, its effect on current
safety-net programs, and the possibility that its cost will
crowd out other proposed and worthy programs, including
national health insurance, college-debt forgiveness or free
tuition, infrastructure spending, and so on. Canarie reasonably asks why, even if one accepts Howard’s diagnosis of the
problem—the possibility of significant job losses through
automation, the inability of many jobs to guarantee
economic security, or as a way to compensate caregivers for
their critical but often unpaid labor—basic income should
be preferred to more traditional targeted, means-tested, and
conditional income-support programs.
Like Howard, I believe that the core features of a basic
income make it a better social welfare policy than the ones
we have in place. Because basic income is universal, rather
than limited to those who prove their financial need, it
means that none of the needy fall through the cracks
between different social policy programs. Because it is
unconditional, rather than limited to those who are able to
work in paid jobs, other contributions to society are recognized and supported. And because basic income is an individual, flat, and additive benefit rather than a benefit scaled
to household size and income, it provides the same benefit,
rather than smaller incremental benefits, to additional
family or household members. This means that individuals
are incentivized to take steps that increase economic security, like marrying or combining households, or taking
part-time or intermittent work where full-time work is
unavailable or impractical.
These important policy advantages do increase the cost
of basic income, as Canarie points out, but the cost can be
minimized by taxing back the basic income from those
whose income or wealth is high enough that they don’t
need it. While it may seem pointless to provide a basic
income with one hand and tax it away with the other, doing
so more effectively targets benefits to those who need them,
especially those whose incomes fluctuate enough from
month to month that they cycle in and out of eligibility for
traditional welfare benefits. Those whose incomes are high
enough not to need the basic income can forego the cash
and take the benefit as a credit against the taxes they owe.
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A universal, but taxable, basic income has another
advantage: it makes the ethical commitment of a basic
income explicit: that everyone in a wealthy, democratic
society should have access to the means necessary for a
healthy and productive life, and that those who can afford
to contribute more to our collective economic security
should do so, just as they contribute more to other forms of
collective security through our progressive tax system. Basic
income is unapologetically redistributive and should be
defended as such: it only makes sense in a society whose
economic systems leads to inequality and insecurity, because
a society with an egalitarian distribution of income and
wealth has no need for a basic income. Our capitalist
economic system allows some individuals to privatize, accumulate, and monopolize economic resources to which
others are denied access and to pass those resources down
to their heirs, entrenching inequality through the generations. It is this kind of economy that gives rise to insecurity
and inequality for large proportions of the population, even
as it may promote overall growth and national prosperity.
Redistributing part of this prosperity as a basic income is a
way to fulfill the implicit promise that allowing privatization provides economic benefits for all, not just the few.
Canarie writes persuasively about the contributions
middle-class workers make to their own success in Maine,
but can hard work really explain the difference between the
average income of the top 1 percent of Mainers—over
$650,000—and the bottom 99%—around $43,00
(Sommellier and Price 2018)? Or the likely divergence in
the future success of the almost 17 percent of children
living in poverty in Maine compared to those living in
households with above average income (US Census Bureau
2017)? If you think that it can, you’re unlikely to be
convinced of the need for a basic income. If you think that
something other than hard work explains at least some of
the variation in our economic success, and that an effective
form of redistribution is necessary to help level the playing
field for all Americans, you might be open to the idea of a
basic income, but remain unconvinced that it is affordable
or feasible at the state or local level. Could Maine implement a basic income on its own?
A full basic income at a level targeted to lift individuals
or families above the federal poverty threshold is probably
beyond the fiscal capacity of a state like Maine. States face
limitations in enacting the kinds of redistributive taxation
that could fund a generous basic income. Tax competition
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with adjoining states imposes limits on how high income
taxes can go without driving the most mobile—likely the
wealthiest—taxpayers across the border. Taxes on financial
wealth, which are being proposed by some Democratic
presidential candidates, are even harder to impose at the
state level. Taxes on real property—houses and land, which
can’t be moved—can be adjusted to raise more revenue
from the wealthy and be redistributed within the state as a
land dividend. Regardless of the form of the tax, it is critical to build support for the basic income to make it
durable across successive administrations, as there is little
benefit to a basic income that lasts for a few years and is
repealed.
To build support for a basic income, it may help to
fund an incremental basic income, starting with the most
sympathetic recipients—children and the elderly—with a
dedicated tax. A universal child allowance, as Howard
suggests, is a good place to begin, although its universality
should mean that it goes to most families, not that it can’t
be taxed back from the wealthiest families; what is
important is that poor and middle-class families don’t have
to document their income and assets before receiving it.
Next could be supplementing federal benefits like
Supplemental Security Income (for the elderly poor) up to
a decent level above the poverty threshold. Finally, Maine
could supplement TANF federal benefits for the working-aged poor, which now come with so many restrictions
that the program fails to reach most of the poor. An unconditional, universal (but taxable for the wealthy) cash
benefit of even a modest amount helps to eliminate the
poverty trap of a life on meager welfare benefits or a life on
low earnings by allowing for both to be combined and can
support work by helping to pay for child care, transportation, training, or education. Eventually, these three benefits
could be combined into a flat and universal basic income.
Dedicated taxation for its financing coupled with
taxing back benefits received by the wealthy mimics the
structure of our most successful economic security
program, Social Security, which is responsible for drastically reducing elderly poverty. It is likely that the implementation of a basic income will likewise follow Social
Security’s path—initially a small benefit, limited to only a
portion of the population, with a gradual expansion of its
tax base, eligible beneficiaries, and benefit level. For Social
Security, state-level implementation, not piloting, was the
spur to federal implementation. Pilots, which are necessarily small and short term, can’t demonstrate the community effects of raising everyone’s income, or the shift to
long-term planning encouraged by an ongoing income
boost. As with Social Security, our best chance to get basic
income onto the national legislative agenda may be
through its adoption in a few forward-thinking states.
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Universal Basic Income Roundtable—
Response to Critics
by Michael Howard

I

begin by thanking Maine Policy Review for organizing
this forum and for this opportunity to reply to the
other contributors. Given the limitations of space, my
remarks will be selective, and I cannot do justice to all the
contributions.
THE REAL COST OF A UBI

B

oth Dave Canarie (2019) and Philip Harvey (2019)
object to the alleged prohibitively high cost of UBI.
Arndt and Widerquist (2019) have adequately explained
the distinction between gross cost and net cost. The gross
cost is misleading because it does “not account for the
substantial amounts of UBI that people pay to themselves.
It neither benefits nor costs you anything if the government both adds and subtracts a dollar to and from your
bank account—even if the addition is called ‘UBI’ and
the subtraction is called a ‘tax.’” What matters is who
benefits and who loses after the UBI is subtracted from
the increased taxes, and this can only be known when the
relevant tax rates are specified so that it is clear who is a net
beneficiary and who is a net contributor. This net cost is in
the range of one-third to one-sixth of the gross cost (Arndt
and Widerquist 2019).
Harvey favors a jobs program instead of a UBI, but he
acknowledges that this will not suffice to bring everyone
out of poverty. Since both he and Canarie speak favorably
of a negative income tax (NIT) as a better way to address
poverty than a UBI, let us compare them.1 Both are forms
of guaranteed minimum income. Let us assume, for the
sake of illustration, that the goal is to ensure that annually
no adult has an income less than $12,000 and no child an
income less than $6,000.
A UBI achieves this simply by giving every adult
$12,000 and every child $6,000 annually, typically in
monthly payments. A NIT achieves this goal by topping up
income to the level of $12,000, typically in a lump sum
after the individual files a tax return. An individual earning
nothing would receive the full $12,000. The benefit phases
out as one earns income, but it is important not to disincentivize labor, so it should not phase out by $1 for every
dollar earned. Workers would then have nothing to gain
from their first $12,000 in earnings and would in effect be
facing the equivalent of 100 percent marginal tax rates.
So let’s suppose that the phase out rate is 50 percent.
For each dollar earned, the worker loses 50 cents of his
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NIT. Thus a worker earning $6,000 in gross income loses
$3,000 of the NIT, but has a net total income of $15,000.
The NIT ensures that the worker does not fall below the
poverty line, and the phase-out ensures that the worker
benefits from employment. There is no benefit cliff or
poverty trap. The benefit phases out entirely only when
the worker earns $24,000 or more in wages (let’s call that
the break-even point). People earning above this amount
are net contributors to the scheme; how much a given
person pays will depend on the tax rates and forms of
taxation.
There is nothing special about a benefit phase-out rate
of 50 percent. If this rate is considered too high, then a
lower rate could be used. A lower rate would raise the
break-even point and extend the benefit further into the
middle class, but it would also increase the total cost to the
net contributors, those paying taxes above the break-even
point.
The cost of such a NIT scheme to guarantee that every
adult receives no less than $12,000 and every child no less
than $6000 annually would be about $539 billion, the
same as what I have called the net cost of a UBI (2015
figures). That’s about one-sixth the gross cost of a UBI,
because NIT payments do not go to everyone, only to those
below the break-even point. As Canarie rightly notes, it
would have about the same effect as a UBI on the incomes
of the poor, precarious workers, and those engaged in
unpaid home care. So why even consider a UBI? First, the
difference in cost is largely an illusion (Arndt and Widerquist
2019; Widerquist 2017; Santens 2017). Second, there are
distinct advantages to a UBI over a means-tested NIT.
Recall that for the UBI, as for the NIT, there will be
net beneficiaries—people who receive more from the UBI
than they pay in taxes toward the scheme—and net
contributors—people who pay more toward the UBI
scheme than they receive from it. So to take Canarie’s
example of the person who makes $500,000 and still gets a
UBI of $12,000—an outcome that “appears [not] to make
sense”—that person will pay more than $12,000 in additional taxes to support the UBI scheme. The “enormous”
increase in taxes of $12,000 is illusory because it is canceled
out by the UBI. The only real tax increase is what is needed
to bring everyone up to the poverty line. And it is about the
same as would be needed for a NIT. The worker making
$6,000 in gross income keeps all of the $12,000 in basic
income, but pays a tax surcharge of 50 percent toward the
27

RESPONSE TO CRITICS

UBI out of earned income, with a net income of $15,000.
Her situation is financially identical to that of the worker
receiving a NIT that phases out at a 50 percent rate. And
again, there is nothing special about a 50 percent tax
surcharge. It could be lower, raising the break-even point
and extending the net benefit further into the middle class
(for details, see Widerquist 2017). But then it will cost
more for the net contributors. (An important point that
Canarie misses is that this tax surcharge is only for the net
beneficiaries, not all taxpayers. The tax rates on net
contributors will vary depending on tax rates, how progressive these are, whether the tax is on income, or wealth, or
consumption). The main takeaway is that the costs to the
net contributors for a UBI and for a NIT are about the
same.
Now, consider the advantages of a UBI:
1.

2.

3.

4.
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Everyone gets it, in the form of a monthly check
or bank deposit. A NIT will go only to those
who file a tax return. This may seem like a small
hurdle for people to jump over for free money,
but one of the major failures of the modern
welfare state is lack of uptake in benefits by
those who need them. For example, nearly a
quarter of people eligible for food stamps do
not apply for them (Delaney 2013). Part of
this reluctance is due to stigma, and perhaps a
NIT would remove enough of the stigma that
attaches to food stamps and other cash benefits
to improve the uptake, but a UBI would likely
do better.
A UBI is there when you need it. When
someone loses a job, the UBI still reliably comes
in. A NIT would need to be applied for, and
in most NIT schemes, one would need to wait
until the end of the year when filing taxes to
receive it (although a NIT could be designed to
be paid in advance, monthly, based on estimated
earnings).
Universal benefits are more popular than
targeted benefits, so much so that universal
benefits, which one would expect to be spread
more thinly than targeted benefits, often
benefit the poor more than targeted benefits,
because the latter are resisted by the rest of
the population. Thus Medicare, public education, and Social Security are well funded, but
TANF benefits do not keep pace with inflation
(Burnside and Floyd 2019).
It is possible that a UBI would be cheaper to
administer. On the one hand, a NIT would
not require collecting the additional taxes,
and distributing checks or bank deposits to

everyone. But on the other hand, means-testing
will require more paperwork and monitoring.
More research is needed on administrative costs,
but the costs of administering either a NIT or
a UBI are small compared to the administration of benefits conditional on work and other
behavioral requirements.
Granting these points, I would nonetheless welcome a
NIT as a good second-best minimum income scheme.
While it lacks UBI’s universality, it shares UBI’s unconditionality, and that is the more important feature. If it has a
better chance of being understood, integrated with the
existing tax system, and passed into law in the US than a
UBI, then I’m for it. But we should not set aside UBI on
the basis of a misunderstanding of its real cost to taxpayers.
UBI AND OTHER WELFARE BENEFITS

D

aniel Soucier (2019) suggests that the current safety
net is well fitted to social needs and that technological change can bring opportunities. No one can deny the
latter, but cash transfers are not meant to take the place of
new forms of work. Rather, they can lighten the burden of
what would otherwise be a very rough transition on those
least able to carry it. More importantly they ensure that
everyone shares in the benefits of technological change,
and not just the small percentage of the population that
owns most of the capital wealth. Luisa Deprez (2019)
puts to rest the idea that the current system of benefits
is adequate. Income from work since the great recession,
even in conjunction with the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), is “not keeping pace with too many families’
basic needs.” Even at full employment, tens of thousands
are officially unemployed in Maine, are involuntarily
part-time, or are discouraged from seeking employment.
And the safety net programs are “eliminated or so severely
restricted that they are unusable by the people who need
them.” UBI (or NIT) could fill some of the gaps. Almaz
Zelleke (2019) shows how the incentives of a UBI scheme
encourage more prudent choices in the labor market and
the household than nonindividualized and conditional
benefits.
Canarie is right to raise the question of the relationship between UBI and other benefits of the welfare state.
But to be clear, unlike some conservative proponents of
UBI, I do not favor eliminating the rest of the welfare state.
Charles Murray (2006) would substitute a UBI not only
for cash benefits but for Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid, and he would require people to use part of their
UBI to purchase health insurance in the private market.
An advantage of Murray’s proposal is that the cost of the
UBI would be covered by the elimination of the other
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benefits, thus setting aside worries about how to pay for it.
However, Murray’s plan would make poor and working
people worse off and should for that reason be rejected
(Zelleke 2008). A sensible welfare reform would substitute
a UBI for some cash benefits, such as TANF or food stamps,
further lowering the actual net cost, but unless pitched at a
very high level, UBI would likely require some topping up
for other benefits, such as unemployment or disability, to
avoid making needy people worse off. This should address
Harvey’s concern about the involuntarily unemployed not
being compensated sufficiently by a UBI. The relevant question is whether all cash benefits should continue to be
conditional and means-tested, or whether some should be
converted into an unconditional UBI. Opponents of UBI
(or NIT) need to be clear in their defense of the conditionalities and justify the consequent stigma, shame, and violations of privacy, poverty traps, and failures of uptake that
result.
Canarie speculates that people would be worse off
trading TANF benefits and food stamps for a UBI of $1,000
per month for adults and $500 per month for children.
However, according to the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities (2018, 2019; Burnside and Floyd 2019), the
combined maximum monthly benefits in Maine, for a
family of three, of TANF, SNAP (food stamps), and the
EITC, is about $1,381. If those programs were replaced by
a UBI combined benefit off $2,500 per month, those families would be better off, and the additional cost of UBI
could be considerably reduced.
JOB GUARANTEES AND UBI

I

agree with Harvey that a minimum income guarantee
(whether UBI or NIT) and a job guarantee can be
complementary. However, the opportunity cost of a UBI is
not as great as he claims, once we focus on the net cost, and
a job guarantee has its own opportunity cost.
As I have argued elsewhere (Howard 2005), there are
good reasons for government-funded jobs, particularly
when there are needs that are not supplied by the market
because of inadequate monetary demand. These include
services for the poor, who lack the money to purchase them,
and the provision of public goods such as roads, education,
public transportation, and alternative energy. But if public
employment goes beyond such expenditures, then the
government is competing with private companies, driving
them out of business and compounding unemployment, or
creating phony jobs that waste public money in order to
preserve the illusion that everyone is working. In these latter
cases, it is better to give people cash. If the need for public
sector jobs is high enough, then a jobs program would
increase the number of net contributors to the UBI, and the
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net cost of a UBI could decrease. But if rising precarity and
job losses due to automation outstrip the need for genuine
public sector jobs, a program that guarantees, in addition, a
good job to everyone who wants one could be very expensive indeed. The administrative and supervisory expenses of
such a program would also be significant and would come
at the expense of more efficient cash transfers and other uses
of public funds.
Harvey is right that a UBI cannot secure the right to
work. That is not its goal. But the income floor can facilitate
employment and other forms of social participation even if
it does not guarantee everyone a job. First, it can enable
people to take internships, or low-paying, but otherwise
desirable jobs, in which skills can be learned and connections made. Second, it can facilitate care work and volunteering that would not be possible without the income
support. The modest UBI proposals under discussion would
not enable everyone to withdraw from the labor market. But
people sharing housing, or pooling income from various
sources, would have options with a UBI that would otherwise not be possible.
LUCK AND FIRST STEPS

C

anarie calls attention to the wealth people have accumulated through hard work, which I do not wish to deny.
But Zelleke (2019) is right to question whether hard work
can explain “the difference between the average income of
the top 1 percent of Mainers...and the bottom 99 percent....
Or the likely divergence in the future success of the almost
17 percent of children living in poverty in Maine compared
to those living in households with above average income.”
Cherry-picking examples of people who have earned most
of their wealth through hard work distracts attention from
the systematic inequalities of opportunity that are due to
luck, and that are compounded over generations. A UBI,
and other policies such as raising the minimum wage, are
designed to share the benefits of rising productivity more
widely, instead of allowing them to be appropriated for no
good social purpose by the wealthiest Americans as a result
of our tax and other policies over the past few decades.
While many questions may remain about meanstesting, the optimal level of a minimum income and how to
finance it, and the relevance, if any, of the gross cost of a
UBI, people who disagree on these questions may still
converge on some first steps such as Zelleke (2019) suggests:
start with the most sympathetic beneficiaries—the elderly
and children—and with a small benefit. If possible, create a
dedicated tax, like that supporting Social Security. If the
policy is successful, the level, the pool of eligible beneficiaries, and the tax base can all be extended. If not, we will have
learned something useful to guide future policy making.
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LIFT-Plus proposes a tax credit, $3,000 for singles,
$6,000 for married couples, that phases out between
$30,000 and $60,000. But Harris’s proposal remains
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it increases with earned income, and if you earn
nothing, you get nothing. Tlaib’s bill has no phase-in,
and so is a genuine NIT: “if you earn $0, you get $3,000
per person. No exceptions.” Lift-Plus goes much further
than LIFT toward eliminating poverty, including the
non-working poor and children, and setting a higher
floor for all (Matthews 2019, 2018).
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